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Saying Goodbye to Unions in Higher 
Education: Labor Policy under the 
Trump Administration 
 
Raymond L. Hogler 





The purpose of this article is to analyze the effects of the Trump 
Administration on collective bargaining in higher education. I examine 
three core areas of labor relations. First, appointees to the National Labor 
Relations Board will change our labor laws to the disadvantage of 
unions. This change impacts private universities. Second, the 
appointment of a new Supreme Court justice affects public sector 
bargaining law through constitutional decisions. Third, more state 
legislatures will enact right to work laws because the political climate is 
favorable to it. All three policy changes will keep labor unions weak and 




raduate student assistants at Yale staged a hunger strike on April 
25, 2017, in support of collective bargaining demands through 
their union representative, Local 33 of UNITE HERE. Despite a 
highly publicized protest during Yale’s commencement ceremony, the 
institution continued to challenge the union’s legitimacy, and the matter 
of collective bargaining rights is now pending before the National Labor 
Relations Board (Rondinone). Yale’s position follows the pattern of 
employer resistance to collective bargaining that pervades American 
labor relations generally and has led to a steady decline in overall union 
membership density over the past four decades (Goldfield). The Yale 
case illustrates the political and legal obstacles that impede unionization 
in higher education.  
This article analyzes the deteriorating status of unions and 
collective bargaining in the American higher education system. It begins 
with a description of the distinctive bargaining regimes in private and 
public sector institutions, followed by an analysis of the present 
condition of organized labor in the United States. With the election of 
President Donald Trump, unions most probably will continue to decline 
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Trump administration has control over the composition of the National 
Labor Relations Board, and recent appointments to the Board indicate a 
shift toward more restrictive rules for organizing. Trump’s recent 
selection to fill the vacancy on the Supreme Court could tilt the playing 
field against public sector unions through the Court’s adverse 
constitutional decisions. The outcomes for higher education faculty are 
likely to be diminished power and influence in the academic environment 
as administrators exercise a greater degree of discretion over wages, 
hours, and conditions of work. 
 
Bargaining Frameworks 
Labor union organizing and bargaining in the United States proceeds 
under two very different regulatory regimes. In the 1935 National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA), Senator Robert Wagner excluded government 
workers from the coverage of his bill in the definition of an “employer” 
in Section 2 (3) of the statute (Wagner). Wagner justified the exclusion 
on various grounds, including constitutional considerations of our federal 
system of governance. As a result, private sector workers are covered by 
the NLRA and regulated by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB 
or Board). Federal, state, or local laws and administrative bodies, in 
contrast, govern public sector unions. Because public educational 
institutions by definition involve “state action,” they are further subject 
to legal doctrines developed under the U.S. Constitution. The 
Universities of Michigan, Wisconsin, and Illinois fall into the latter 
category, while Harvard, Yale, Columbia, and Duke are considered to be 
in the private sector.  
Public sector bargaining law generally does not give employees 
the broad panoply of rights available to workers under the NLRA 
(National Council of State Laws). Senator Wagner ensured that private 
sector employees had important protections such as the right to negotiate 
over wages, hours, and working conditions, and to strike in support of 
their demands for concessions. Strikers did not abandon their 
employment but were entitled to reinstatement as vacant positions 
became available. In the case of a strike over the employer’s unfair labor 
practices rather than economic conditions, strikers could demand 
immediate reinstatement if they were willing to give up the strike. In the 
public sector, strikes may be prohibited, bargaining may be confined to a 
more limited agenda, and rights of reinstatement may be unavailable 
(Corder). For both private and public sector unionism, the legal rules 
governing union formation and operation play a crucial role in allocating 
balances of power in the economic sphere.  
 
Unions and Wealth Distribution 
Historically, labor union membership density in the U.S has been 
associated with union bargaining power and contracts that promote a 
more equitable distribution of income in this country. During the two 
decades after World War II, wealth became more evenly distributed, but 
as membership density declines, union influence over labor markets 
becomes relatively weaker. An important study by sociologists Bruce 
Western and Jake Rosenfeld examined the effects of union decline on 
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rising wage inequality in the United States. Analyzing various 
explanations for union weakness, they concluded that unions 
traditionally performed a role in labor markets by acting as “pillars of the 
moral economy” (517). Institutionally, unions supported “norms of 
equity that claimed the fairness of a standard rate for low-pay workers 
and the injustice of unchecked earnings for managers and owners”  
(518). Such norms arose through three distinct union functions: “(1) 
culturally, through public speech about economic inequality, (2) 
politically, by influencing social policy, and (3) institutionally, through 
rules governing the labor market” (Western and Rosenfeld 518). 
Declining unions exert less control over labor markets, culture, and 
national politics.  
According to observers of the 2016 national election, white 
middle-aged men without college degrees tilted the electoral vote in 
favor of Donald Trump (Cohn). Those voters acted out of a sense of 
economic desperation, believing that the era of good jobs and increasing 
incomes had ended for them. Three well-known economists, Thomas 
Piketty, Emmanuel Saez, and Gabriel Zucman, published a commentary 
describing the “two countries” making up the U.S. political economy. 
Their analysis showed that in 1962, the share of pre-tax income in this 
country going to the top one percent and the bottom 50 percent of 
income earners was approximately 20 percent to the lower earners and 
just above 12 percent for the top earners. By 2014, the numbers had 
reversed, with 20 percent of wealth going to the top one percent and just 
over 12 percent to the bottom 50 percent. One of their recommendations 
to meliorate the trend is political action leading to “reforms of labor 
market institutions to boost workers’ bargaining power and including a 
higher minimum wage.”  
If weaker unions result in higher levels of inequality and 
undermine standards of social justice, a relevant point of inquiry is 
whether President Trump’s labor policies are more likely to strengthen or 
debilitate labor organizations across the economy, including those in 
higher education. The likely answer is that unions will suffer under his 
administration. Inadvertently or intentionally through his administration, 
the demographic that successfully installed Trump as President will 
endure the most serious economic injury during his time in office 
(Krugman). The harm inflicted on unions has three aspects. The first is 
Trump’s recent appointment of Neil Gorsuch to the Supreme Court and 
the Court’s future labor decisions. The second is the present membership 
of the National Labor Relations Board following Trump’s appointment 
of two members to vacant positions. The third is the favorable political 
condition for the enactment of right-to-work laws in state legislatures 
under the guise of “economic development,” a strategic choice that 
results in lower wages and benefits for workers. Taken together, Trump’s 
influence in those legal domains has serious implications for collective 
bargaining, specifically for academic unions.  
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As noted, private sector higher education institutions bargain under the 
regulatory authority of the NLRB. The Board membership in May 2017 
consisted of Chairman Philip A. Miscimarra, a Republican appointed by 
former president Obama, and Democrats Lauren McFerran and Mark 
Gaston Pearce,whose terms end in 2018 and 2019, respectively. Trump 
has the authority during his term to appoint two additional members to 
bring the Board to its full complement of five members. If those 
appointees share Miscimarra’s views on labor issues, then Board doctrine 
will likely drift in favor of employers, and it could return to more 
restrictive rules about student workers.  
According to a news report in July 2017, a Senate committee 
approved two Trump appointees, William Emanuel and Marvin Kaplan, 
to the Board (Lanard, 2017). Emanuel is with the firm of Littler 
Mendelson, which represents management in labor relations matters, and 
Kaplan presently works for the Occupational Safety and Health Review 
Commission. Three labor relations experts predicted, “If confirmed, 
Kaplan and Emanuel would give the five-member board a Republican 
majority. The NLRB is widely expected to use that majority to 
reconsider big ticket labor issues, including rulings that expanded joint 
employer liability and recognized ‘micro-units’ for collective bargaining 
purposes” (Eidelson, Opfer & Penn).  
The Board’s most recent decisions involving student assistants at 
Columbia University illustrate both the decisional processes of the Board 
and likely direction of Trump’s appointees. In August 2016, the Board 
ruled that student assistants employed at the university were statutory 
employees entitled to vote in a certification election (National Labor 
Relations Board). The employees voted in favor of unionization by a 
margin of 1,602 votes for the union and 623 opposed, and Columbia then 
filed exceptions to the election arguing that students were improperly 
designated as employees (Harris, 2016). As of April 2017, the Board had 
not resolved the matter, and the case was still pending. The Union 
attorney informed the Regional Director’s office in March 2017 that 
further delay would lead to substantial changes in the makeup of the 
union because many of the students would be graduating (Meiklejohn). 
While the case languishes, new Trump appointees could reach a different 
result concerning the eligibility of graduate students to vote in a 
certification election.  
The more recent case at Yale raises the same issues as at 
Columbia. The Yale administration refuses to bargain with the certified 
union, Local 33 UNITE HERE, on the theory that the Board made an 
inappropriate unit determination. If Columbia prevails with the Trump 
Board on the issue of whether or not graduate students are statutory 
“employees,” the Yale proceeding will be moot because the students do 
not fall under the protections of the NLRA. Even if Yale entered into 
negotiations with the students, no collective bargaining through a 
representative outside the NLRA framework can legally occur without 
violating the NLRA prohibition against employer-dominated “company 
unions” in Section 8 (a) (2) of the Act. Given an adverse decision by the 
Board on the definitional issue, Local 33 might pursue judicial review 
4
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through the federal court system, but the case likely would consume at 
least three years before resolution.  
After fourteen days of Yale’s strike, three union supporters were 
continuing the fast (Ricks). Yale officially criticized the work action, 
commenting that the “actions this week by members of Local 33 raise 
concerns about the safety and well-being of the demonstrators and about 
their apparent disregard for longstanding university policies and 
principles regarding the appropriate time, place and manner for 
exercising freedom of expression” (Yale News). Yale also retained a 
well-known labor law firm to defend its interests before the National 
Labor Relations Board (NLRB). The university’s strategy challenges the 
“micro unit” approach adopted by the union and approved by the NLRB, 
which fragmented the class of graduate teaching assistants along 
departmental lines. Yale claimed that “the low vote count (under 9%) 
was due to Local 33’s ‘micro-unit’ strategy of holding nine separate 
union elections, and preventing students in the rest of the school’s 
departments from having a say on the question of unionization” (Yale 
News). 
If a new Board rejects the Columbia and Yale decisions, 
graduate student unions will disappear. Even more damaging, the Board 
might use its rulemaking power to overturn regulations of the Obama 
Board that favor union organizing. One of the most contentious areas of 
rulemaking involves streamlining the elections process toward the goal 
of faster elections and certification. Employers dubbed the new 
procedures as the “quickie election” rule and argued that it disadvantaged 
employers who had little opportunity to inform employees of their views 
of unionization and imposed intrusive rules that violated employee rights 
of privacy. Despite those objections, the rule survived judicial challenge 
in the federal court system (Fisher Phillips), but they may not withstand a 
change in Board composition. With two new members, the Board could 
quickly overturn the election rule and reinstate the previous election 
procedures.  
In 2017, private sector union membership fell to 6.4 percent of 
the nonsupervisory, nonagricultural workforce. The decline spanned 
some five decades from a peak of nearly 35 percent in 1945 to its present 
rate (Freeman). Because unions historically influenced labor markets 
such that unionized workers gained more bargaining power and 
compensation, trends in membership suggest that middle-income 
employees will continue to lose ground. President Trump’s policies will 
do nothing to resurrect private unions; to the contrary, his appointments 
will lead to even weaker unions. In the public sector, the U.S. Supreme 
Court will accomplish a similar agenda through a five-member majority 
having little understanding of, or consideration for, organized labor. 
 
The Fate of Public Sector Unions in the New Supreme Court 
In January 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the case of 
Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association, which involved the 
compulsory payment of union dues by teachers covered under a 
collective bargaining agreement. The controlling precedent in the 
litigation, Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ. (1977), upheld the 
5
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constitutionality of public sector union security and announced the 
standard applicable to the issue of union dues. The Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals (Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association, n.d.) followed 
the precedent of Abood and declared, “Upon review, the court finds that 
the questions presented in this appeal are so insubstantial as not to 
require further argument, because they are governed by controlling 
Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent.” In short, compulsory dues 
were an accepted dimension of public sector bargaining and were not 
constitutionally suspect. 
Legal commentators suggested that the Supreme Court might use 
Friedrichs as the vehicle for changing the rules of dues payments to 
public sector unions. In Knox v. Service Employees International Union, 
a majority made up of Alito, Roberts, Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas 
invalidated a union dues assessment because the union failed to give 
notice to members that the assessment would be imposed, and 
Sotomayor and Ginsburg concurred with the majority on this point. Alito 
added that all compulsory dues would be constitutionally suspect if 
members had failed to “opt in” to dues payments as opposed to an “opt 
out” rule. Alito proposed the notion that public sector union security was 
only valid if the employee had “opted in” to dues payments. Otherwise, 
Alito said, no required dues payments were constitutionally permissible 
(Hogler, “Constitutionalizing Paycheck Protection”). Fortunately for 
unions, Alito was merely indulging in dicta that had nothing to do with 
the actual case itself because the facts did not raise the question (Fisk & 
Chemerinsky). Justice Sotomayor convincingly made the point in her 
dissenting opinion in the case.  
Plaintiffs in the Friederich litigation anticipated that the 
Supreme Court would finish the job begun in Knox and do away with 
compulsory dues payments in the public sector. They developed a 
litigation strategy that directly attacked union security by focusing on 
First Amendment protections against “coercive” support for unions’ 
political agendas. As the case moved through the lower courts, the union 
prevailed based on the Abood precedent. On further appeal following 
Scalia’s death, the Supreme Court divided equally with four Justices on 
each side and affirmed the lower court decisions approving compulsory 
dues. In the absence of a fifth vote, right to work proponents were 
stymied momentarily. When President Obama nominated federal Circuit 
Court judge Merrick Garland to the Supreme Court, Senate Leader 
McConnell refused to proceed with the nomination. Trump, 
consequently, picked a more conservative jurist, Neil Gorsuch, for 
appointment and McConnell successfully moved the nomination through 
the Senate. 
In the interim, the National Right to Work Foundation and their 
anti-union allies quickly procured another set of plaintiffs to challenge 
public sector dues payments. In Janus v. American Federation of State, 
County, and Municipal Employees, two public employees sued the union 
representing them, claiming their constitutional rights of free speech 
were violated by the compelled payment of union dues. The Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the case (Janus), and the plaintiffs 
are now appealing that dismissal to the Supreme Court. A similar case 
6
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from California, Yohn v. California Teachers Association, is funded by 
the same litigation machine and will replace the Friedrichs decision with 
essentially the same facts and arguments (Blume). Gorsuch, an admirer 
of Justice Scalia and an acolyte of Justice Kennedy, will presumably 
follow the lead of his doctrinal progenitors. The most likely outcome will 
be that public employment in the future will take place under the right to 
work principle of allowing free riders (Higgins).  
For collective bargaining units on public campuses, the 
immediate effect of the teachers’ cases will be to reduce the resources 
available to sustain union power. If the Court adopts the conservative 
formulation announced by Alito in Knox, that ruling would immediately 
impose a constitutional burden on teachers’ unions to suspend all 
required dues payments unless members expressly agree to the 
deductions. That outcome effectively results in the creation of a right to 
work rule. A substantial body of research indicates that right to work 
laws reduce workers’ incomes and reduce union density (Gould & 
Kimball). Public sector unions now make up a larger proportion of total 
union density than at any time in modern labor relations. As they erode, 
unionization generally suffers, and private sector density will likewise 
continue to decline. 
 
 
How Right to Work Laws Affect both Private and Public Sector 
Unions 
One of the most debilitating factors in union decline is the weakening of 
collective security through right to work laws. Beginning during World 
War II, several states attacked labor unions with laws that prohibited 
contracts requiring all individuals covered by the agreement to pay dues 
to the union representative (Gall; Hogler, End of American Labor 
Unions). Historian Michael Goldfield attributed union decline to the 
“changing balance of class forces” and presciently argued that 
membership density would continue to fall because of employer hostility 
to unionism. Right to work is the hinge of anti-unionism in the United 
States and a powerful manipulation of cultural shifts against collective 
bargaining. 
Section 14(b) allows states to enact right to work laws, and since 
the implementation of the statute, 28 states have enacted such laws 
(National Right to Work Committee, 2017). Various studies 
convincingly document the damage to unions caused by right to work 
laws. Hogler, Hunt, and Weiler analyzed the downward trajectory of 
union strength in right to work states and concluded that the presence of 
right to work is negatively correlated with union density. The mechanism 
underlying the decline is a failure of generalized trust between citizens of 
a state and their fellows; that is, most people believe others cannot be 
trusted. A key finding of the study is that the declining level of trust is 
correlated with declining union membership. That is, the less trust that 
exists within a given community, the less likely that the community will 
commit to collective action on behalf of the group. Trust is lower in right 
to work states because free riders can obtain the benefits of group effort 
7
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without incurring the costs, which in turn negatively influences union 
membership density and incomes.   
The expansion of right to work laws accelerated between 2012 
and 2017. There are now twenty-eight Right-to-Work states, with the 
states of Kentucky and Missouri adopting laws in 2017. Beginning in the 
South and West in the 1940s, the movement was transparently anti-union 
in its objective and designed to counter the growth and influence of 
organized labor (Tandy, 81-118). Right to work sentiment will flourish 
under the Trump presidency and its business-friendly agenda. Since its 
inception, right to work has appealed to the ideology of development by 
arguing that unions interfere with legitimate business operations and 
stifle innovation and growth (Hogler, End of American Labor Unions).  
 
Conclusion: No Way Out 
The election of Donald Trump will have detrimental consequences for 
the American labor movement in three significant ways. First, his 
appointments to the National Labor Relations Board will reverse 
decisions of the Obama Board that facilitated union organizing and 
empowered employees by strengthening their rights to unionize. Second, 
with the appointment of Neil Gorsuch to the Supreme Court, Trump 
ensures a continuing tilt toward the politicized views of Thomas, Alito, 
and Roberts on labor issues. Finally, the Court’s future decisions will 
degrade workers’ opportunities for collective action and enhance 
managerial power in the workplace, especially in public sector 
employment. As the conflictual political division in our system ossifies 
into ongoing stalemate, Trump comes to represent the apogee of 
ineptitude. White, working class voters brought him to power, but his 
allegiance is to the wealthy financial interests that stand to gain from his 
administration.  
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